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Abstract
This paper addresses two hot topics of the contemporary debate, social
capital and economic growth. Our theoretical analysis sheds light on de-
cisive but so far neglected issues: how does social capital accumulate over
time? Which is the relationship between social capital, technical progress
and economic growth in the long run?
The analysis shows that the economy may be attracted by alternative
steady states, depending on the initial social capital endowments and cul-
tural exogenous parameters representing the relevance of social interaction
and trust in well-being and production.
When material consumption and relational goods are substitutable, the
choice to devote more and more time to private activities may lead the
economy to a “social poverty trap”, where the cooling of human relations
causes a progressive destruction of the entire stock of social capital. In
this case, the relationship of social capital with technical progress is de-
scribed by an inverted U-shaped curve. However, the possibility exists for
the economy to follow a virtuous trajectory where the stock of social cap-
ital endogenously and unboundedly grows. Such result may follow from
a range of particular conditions, under which the economy behaves as if
there was no substitutability between relational activities and material
consumption.
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1 Introduction
The positive role of social capital in growth and development is one of the
most popular and controversial theses standing in the contemporary economic
debate. Even if theoretical and empirical research have produced a huge amount
of papers on the topic, this field of research still suffers from some endemic
problems. Firstly, economic studies generally focus on the possible effects of
social capital on a range of supposed outcomes, with a strong attention to
innovation, technology adoption and growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997, Rodrik,
1999, Zak and Knack, 2001, Isham, 2002, Annen, 2003, Akçomakak and ter
Weel, 2009). However, we lack a micro-founded theory explaining the causal
mechanisms, and the reverse effect of growth and technical progress on human
interactions is neglected in the literature.
Secondly, there is a surprising lack of studies addressing the sources of social
capital. The dominant view in sociology is that social capital is a public good
incidentally accumulated as a by-product of diverse relational activities (Cole-
man, 1988). This form of capital exists only when it is shared, i.e. it needs
some kind of interaction to be exploited to the pursuit of common interests
(Bourdieu, 1980, Coleman, 1990). By contrast, theoretical studies in economics
are basically tied down to Becker’s (1974) theory of social interaction, where
social capital is an individual resource created through rational self-interested
investment decisions.
This paper aims to contribute both to the growth and the social capital lit-
erature by shedding light on the following questions: which are the dynamics of
social capital’s interaction with economic growth? How is social capital created
and accumulated over time? Does technical progress influence the accumulation
dynamics? Do we have to trust the folk wisdom according to which technology
is one of the major responsible for the widespread social isolation of our time?
To reach this goal, we develop a dynamic model where social capital en-
ters as an argument in the agents’ utility functions and as an input in private
and relational goods’ production functions. Social capital is here defined as the
sum of networks of trust-intensive relations that the agents incidentally develop
through the simultaneous production and consumption of relational goods. Re-
lational goods are a distinctive type of good that can only be enjoyed if shared
with others.
We integrate hints from sociology and political science into an economic
framework by assuming that the stock of social capital accumulated as a by-
product of social participation functions as a public good, which benefits all
individuals equally. In this way, we explicitly model also one of the most popular
claims raised in the social capital debate, i.e. its role in private production.
Specifically, the assumption we draw from the empirical literature is that the
diffusion of trust boosted by shared values and social participation reduces the
average cost of transactions, thereby fostering the economic activity and growth
(Knack and Keefer, 1997, Rodrik, 1999, Zak and Knack, 2001, Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales, 2004, Beugelsdijk and van Shaik, 2005, Antoci, Sacco and Vanin,
2007).
2
Our analysis starts from the observation that, even if private and relational
goods satisfy different needs, the private good can be consumed as a substitute
for the relational one. For example, when the social environment is poor, people
may be constrained to replace human interactions, e.g. joining the meetings of
a cultural circle or playing football with friends, with private consumption, e.g.
staying at home and watching a TV show or playing a virtual match against
the computer.
The analysis of agents’ time allocation choices accounts for the alternative
cases of zero or positive Edgeworth substitutability between the two types of
good. In our analytical framework, social participation is constant at a given
level if the two goods are not Edgeworth substitutes. However, it seems to be
more realistic to assume a positive degree of Edgeworth substitutability between
the two types of goods. In such a case, an increase in the stock of social cap-
ital can enhance the productivity of time spent on social interaction, thereby
encouraging the consumption of relational goods. This process results in a pos-
itive level of participation, which in turn creates and strengthens durable ties
increasing the stock of social capital.
The analysis of dynamics shows that the economy may be attracted by
alternative steady states, depending on the initial wealth of social capital and
cultural exogenous parameters representing the importance of social interaction
and trust in well-being and production.
The possibility exists for the economy to fall down in a “social poverty
trap”, where agents devote all their time to private activities. In this case, the
cooling of relations may cause a progressive destruction of the entire stock of
social capital. According to common wisdom, the link leading from economic
growth to social isolation is technology. In an interview to the New York Times,
Robert Putnam stated that “The distinctive effect of technology has been to
enable us to get entertainment and information while remaining entirely alone.
It’s fundamentally bad because the lack of social contact, the social isolation
means that we don’t share information and values and outlook that we should”.
Introducing exogenous technical progress in the production function of pri-
vate goods indeed leads to interesting modifications in social capital’s accu-
mulation dynamics. If there is not Edgeworth substitutability between private
and relational goods, the stock of social capital can grow indefinitely along any
trajectories or alternatively tend to zero according to the value of the model’s
parameters. Its trend relative to technical progress can be monotonic (always in-
creasing or decreasing) or can experience an initial decline followed by a growth,
but not vice versa (a growth followed by a decline is impossible).
Under the more realistic assumption of positive Edgeworth substitutability,
social capital may experience a growth followed by a decline, so that its relation-
ship with technical progress is described by an inverted-u shaped curve. Since
technical progress is in turn positively correlated with GNP, our results sup-
port Putnam’s (2000) intuition of the inverted-u shaped relationship between
social capital and income. Along the inverted-u shaped curve, private activi-
ties infinitely expand at the expenses of social interaction, thereby trapping the
economy in a situation of social poverty.
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However, also in the context of substitutability, if social capital’s initial
endowments are high enough, the economy can follow a growth path along
which both technical progress and social capital grow indefinitely.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section two briefly reviews the litera-
ture on social capital and growth with a particular attention for the hypotheses
we integrate into the model. Sections three and four present the model and ana-
lyze its dynamics. Section five studies the effect of exogenous technical progress
on social capital’s dynamics. The paper is closed by a discussion of results and
policy implications.
2 Social capital and growth
The public good features of social capital are now commonly acknowledged in
the recent debate. It is possible to argue that the functioning of the economy
itself relies on those institutions (whether formal or informal) that the literature
often groups together under the common label of social capital (e.g. norms of
trust and reciprocity, moral sanctions, newtorks of relationships, and organiza-
tions). If that is the case, then the economy’s possibility of “reproducing” itself,
thereby experiencing sustainable growth, depends also on its ability to foster -
or, at least, to preserve - its endowments of social capital. On this basis, the idea
is spreading that a better understanding of the role of norms and relationships
would be a crucial step for the advancement of modern political economy. In the
last two decades, such idea has informed the development of a huge number of
empirical studies, exploring the effect of social capital on an immense range of
phenomena, from political participation to the institutional performance, from
health to the economic success of countries. The seminal study in the field is
the so-called “Italian work” by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), which ex-
plains the different institutional and economic performance of the Italian regions
as the result of the influence exerted by some aspects of the social structure,
summarized into the multidimensional concept of “social capital”. Empirical
research in economics has then been prompted by a series of notable tests of
Putnam’s hypotheses (Knack and Keefer, 1997, La Porta et al., 1997, Temple
and Johnson, 1998, Whiteley, 2000, Knack, 2003, Beugelsdijk and van Schaik,
2005).
We do not want to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the empirical
research here (see Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, and Sabatini, 2007, for exhaus-
tive reviews). To our purposes, it is important to point out that this strand of
the literature unanimously converges on the claim that one of the mechanisms
through which social capital impacts economic efficiency is by enhancing the
level of trust and reducing uncertainty. The basic idea is that a social environ-
ment rich of participation opportunities is a fertile ground for nurturing trust
and shared values. Repeated interactions foster the diffusion of information and
raise reputations’ relevance. The higher opportunity cost of free-riding in pris-
oners’ dilemma kind of situations makes the agents’ behavior more foreseeable
causing an overall reduction of uncertainty. Therefore, an increase in trust-
4
based relations reduces monitoring costs and, more in general, the average cost
of transactions. Our model accounts for these claims through the assumption
that social capital enters as an input in the production of private goods.
The direction of the nexus connecting social capital to the economic perfor-
mance and growth is another subject of contention in the empirical literature.
Even if most studies agree on the positive role of networks and trust, we have
few evidence on the reverse effect possibly played by growth on the accumula-
tion of social capital. On this regard, two conflicting hypotheses emerge from
the debate.
a) Growth has positive “social” externalities. The “workplace hypothesis”.
Development may reinforce social participation by providing the material
and cultural bases for an increase in relational goods’ production and consump-
tion. Empirical studies have shown that higher levels of education and wealth
are indeed associated with higher social participation (Temple and Johnson,
1998, Sabatini, 2008). In addition, it is noteworthy that more developed coun-
tries are generally governed by democratic regimes. The respect of civil rights
associated with democracy is a necessary precondition for the development of
associational activities and certainly encourages the consumption of relational
goods (Fox, 1996, Offe, 1999, Rahn et al, 1999, Stolle, 2001, Paxton, 2002).
Bilson (1982) shows that civil liberties are strongly associated with per capita
income. The author’s interpretation is that economic performance determines
freedoms, rather than the other way around.
On the contrary, in situations of underdevelopment and poverty, a non co-
operative behavior may be regarded as the most effective survival strategy. For
example, the mutual assistance mechanisms developed within the family unit,
which Banfield (1958) referred to as a result of the “amoral familism”, could
be looked on as a defence reaction against situations of economic and social
poverty, where both the state’s and market’s institutions are weak (Sabatini,
2009).
The causal mechanism positively connecting economic growth to social par-
ticipation may work through two main channels:
1) wealthier and more educated people generally have stronger cultural needs
and civic awareness. Thus, they devote a higher amount of time to cultural
consumption (e.g. going to the cinema) and associational activities (e.g. joining
the meetings of cultural or political circles) which boost the production and
consumption of relational goods.
2) On the job interactions may stimulate the creation of durable ties among
workers. Friendships often start on the workplace, both spontaneously and as
a result of precise human resources management strategies. As the business
literature shows, nurturing a good relational climate inside the firm is gener-
ally a key task for management. In political science, several schools of thought
claim that citizens can develop their relational and political attitudes at the
workplace. Non-hierarchical work structures allowing workers to participate in
decision making processes are a generator of face-to-face interactions that stim-
ulate the sharing of social norms and the creation of interpersonal ties (Karasek
1976, Smith 1985, Peterson 1992, Goul Andersen and Hoff 2001, Schur, 2003).
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Moreover, the workplace is a training ground where people improve those com-
munication and organizational abilities which are crucial for the production and
consumption of relational goods. In other words, such skills raise the produc-
tivity of time spent on social participation. Those who possess well-developed
relational skills are likely to find social and political participation less daunting
and costly (Elden 1981, Greenberg 1986, Burn and Konrad 1987, Brady et al.
1995, Verba et al. 1995). Remarkably, many authors claim that on the job
interactions foster the development of democratic attitudes (Paterman, 1970,
Verba et al., 1995), and active political participation (Sobel, 1993, Greenberg
et al. 1996, Mutz and Mondak, 2006, Adman, 2008).
In this paper, we take hints from political science seriously and explicitly
model the “workplace hypothesis”, assuming that private production fosters re-
lational goods’ consumption and the accumulation of social capital as a spillover
effect.
b) Growth has negative “social” externalities. The “Machine hypothesis”.
On the other side, it is possible to argue that the pressure exerted on time
by economic growth acts as a factor hampering the consolidation of social ties,
thereby leading to an erosion of the stock of social capital. As everyday life
experience suggests, time constraints are ever more pressing in modern societies.
At the theoretical level, the negative externalities of growth have been quite
neglected by the literature. Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) show that the
technical change and innovation generally associated to growth influence social
capital by rising labour mobility: higher levels of turnover may hamper the
consolidation of social ties, both inside and outside the workplace. Moreover,
the uncertainty of future incomes related to increased mobility affects any form
of long-term planning of life activities such as marriage and procreation. Antoci,
Sacco and Vanin (2007) show that the expansion of market activities implies a
growing pressure on time, which compresses the social sphere of individuals.
As a consequence, the process of economic growth may be accompanied by
a progressive “social impoverishment” of the economy. As the authors state,
an early account of this process is given by Hirsch (1976): “As the subjective
cost of time rises, pressure for specific balancing of personal advantage in social
relationships will increase. ... Perception of the time spent in social relationships
as a cost is itself a product of privatized aﬄuence. The effect is to whittle down
the amount of friendship and social contact ... . The huge increase in personal
mobility in modern economies adds to the problem by making sociability more
of a public and less of a private good. The more people move, the lower are
the chances of social contacts being reciprocated directly on a bilateral basis”
(p.80).
According to common wisdom, growth’s perverse effects on social cohesion
are bound to be exacerbated by technical progress. Exactly 100 years ago, E.M.
Forster (1909) described one of the most intriguing accounts of technology and
society in the future. In his short story “The Machine Stops”, the novelist de-
scribes a prophetic vision of the internet simply called “the Machine”: people
around the globe have given up direct interaction with each other, opting in-
stead to communicate and obtain new “ideas” through the Machine virtually.
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Each person occupies their own room that supplies all their material needs and
makes “the terrors of direct experience” unnecessary and undesirable. The idea
that technology is one of the major responsible of the widespread social iso-
lation of our time has get stronger and stronger in the last century, walking
at the same pace of technological advance. Besides folk wisdom and literary
fascinations, recent empirical studies suggest that communication technologies
like TV (Corneo, 2005, Bruni and Stanca, 2009), cell phones (McPherson and
Smith-Lovin, 2006), and internet (Gershuny 2003, Nie et al., 2002, Boase et
al. 2006, Wellman et al. 2006) may interfere with face-to-face interactions.
However, we lack theoretical analyses addressing the micro foundations of the
possible linkage between technical progress and social isolation. In section five
we test the “Machine hypothesis” by studying the effect of exogenous technical
progress on social capital’s accumulation dynamics.
The model in section three integrates the hypotheses suggested above and
in the introduction: agents chose how to allocate their time between labour,
aimed at the production of private goods, and social participation activities,
that generate social capital as a by-product. Private production exerts positive
spillover effects on relational goods’ production and consumption (“workplace
hypothesis”). In section four we analyze the long-run dynamics of the interac-
tion between growth and the accumulation of social capital, showing that the
economy may fall in a social poverty trap depending on the initial social capital
endowments and cultural exogenous parameters representing the relevance of
social interaction and trust in well-being and production.
3 The model
The notion of social capital taken into account within our framework is defined as
the sum of networks of trust-intensive relations that the agents develop through
the simultaneous production and consumption of relational goods.
We consider a population of size 1 constituted by a continuum of individuals.
We assume that, in each instant of time t, the well-being of the individual
i ∈ [0, 1] depends on the consumption of two goods: a private good, Ci(t), and
a socially provided good, Bi(t). We assume that Bi(t) is produced through the
joint action of the time devoted by agent i to social activities, si(t), the average
social participation s(t) =
∫ 1
0
si(t)di , and the stock of social capital Ks(t):
Bi(t) = F (si(t), s(t),Ks(t)) (1)
Since relational goods can be enjoyed only if shared with others, their pro-
duction process depends on the others’ social participation and on the stock of
networks existing in the surrounding environment.
The time agent i does not spend for social participation, 1−si(t), is used as
input in the production of the output Yi(t) of the private good. As suggested by
Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2005, 2008), we assume that social capital plays also
a role in the production process of the private good. In this way, we explicitly
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model one of the most popular claims raised by the empirical literature. In
addition, for simplicity, we assume that Ci(t) = Yi(t), that is Yi(t) cannot be
accumulated, and that the production process of Yi(t) requires only the input
1− si(t) and Ks(t):
Ci(t) = Yi(t) = G(1− si(t),Ks(t)) (2)
The functions F and G in (1) and (2) are assumed to be strictly increasing in
each argument Note that, in such context, 1−si(t) can be interpreted as the time
spent both to produce and to consume Ci(t). A peculiarity of relational goods
is that it is virtually impossible to separate their production from consumption,
since they easily coincide.
The accumulation of social capital is highly path-dependent: on the one
side, it improves the technology of production of relational goods; on the other
side greater social participation taking the form of higher levels of relational
goods’ production and consumption fosters the consolidation of ties and trust
among people, thereby increasing the stock of social capital as a by-product. Of
course we cannot exclude the possibility that agents engage in social activities
for instrumental purposes (for example, to achieve a better job). However,
following hints from rational choice sociology (Coleman, 1990), we assume that
most of the times the creation of interpersonal ties does not depend on rational
investment decisions. Thus, as in Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2005, 2007, 2008),
social capital is accumulated as a by-product of social participation. Following
hints from political science, we model the “workplace hypothesis” described in
the previous section by assuming that the production of private goods exerts a
positive spillover on social capital’s accumulation. Furthermore, since human
relations need care to be preserved, we introduce a positive social capital’s
depreciation rate to account for their possible cooling over time:
K˙s(t) = H
[
B(t), Y (t)
]
− ηKs(t) (3)
where K˙s(t) indicates the time derivative of Ks(t), the parameter η > 0 is
the depreciation rate of Ks(t), B(t) =
∫ 1
0 Bi(t)di and Y (t) = C(t) =
∫ 1
0 Yi(t)di
are the average production/consumption of the socially provided good and the
average production/consumption of the private good, respectively. The resulting
stock is a public resource, which enters as an argument in every agent’s utility
function due to its ability to contribute to the production of both private and
relational goods.
For simplicity, we consider the following specifications for (1),(2),(3):
Yi(t) = [1− si(t)] ·K
α
s (t)
Bi(t) = s
ε(t) · s1−εi (t) ·K
γ
s (t)
K˙s(t) =
[
Y (t)
]β
·
[
B(t)
]δ
− ηKs(t) (4)
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where ε ∈ (0, 1) is the productivity of time spent on social interaction in the
individuals’ production process of relational goods, and α, β, γ, δ > 0.
Note that a positive average social participation s(t) > 0 is essential for the
production/consumption of Bi(t), that is Bi(t) = 0 if s(t) = 0 whatever the
values of si(t) and Ks(t) are. If no one participates, single agents have no pos-
sibility to enjoy relational goods, even in presence of a positive stock of social
capital. If γ > α, then the role of social capital is more relevant in the pro-
duction/consumption of relational goods than in the production/consumption
of private goods.
According to (4), B(t) and Y (t) are both essential factors for the accumula-
tion of social capital, that is the stock of social capital Ks(t) decreases (that is
K˙s(t) < 0) if B(t) = 0 or Y (t) = 0.
Finally, we assume that the instantaneous utility function of individual i is:
Ui [Ci(t), Pi(t)] = lnCi(t) + b lnPi(t) (5)
where Pi(t) represents the whole of social needs, Ci(t) are the agents’ private
needs, and b > 0 measures the relative importance of social needs in respect to
private ones. We assume that private goods can satisfy both private and social
needs. As pointed out in the introduction, private goods can be used as an
imperfect surrogate of human interactions to meet certain social needs, or to
compensate the deprivation of socially enjoyed pleasures. If the surrounding
environment is socially poor, agents may choose to replace human interactions
with private consumption (e.g. they may play a virtual match against the
computer instead of meeting friends on a sport field, or chat with unknown and
distant people through the web instead of talking with neighbours). On the
contrary, relational goods cannot satisfy primary needs such as food, security,
clothing, and shelter. A useful way to describe this issue is to consider the
following linear specification:
Pi(t) = Bi(t) + d ·Ci(t) (6)
where the parameter d measures the degree of Edgeworth substitutability
between Bi(t) and Ci(t) with respect to the production of Pi(t). If d = 0, then
there is no Edgeworth substitutability between the two goods. Note that, if
d > 0, the mixed partial derivative of Ui with respect to Ci(t) and Bi(t) is
strictly negative:
∂2Ui
∂Ci∂Bi
= −
bd
(dCi +Bi)
2 < 0
This means that the lower the value of Bi(t) is, the greater the marginal utility
of private consumption Ci(t) will be. As argued by Antoci, Sacco and Vanin
(2007), it is more rewarding to interact with people in a context that offers many
options for socially enjoyed leisure. On the contrary, if the social environment is
poor, and people have few chances to meet and enjoy relational goods, private
consumption is more rewarding. For the brevity’s sake, from now the term
“substitutability” will mean “Edgeworth substitutability”.
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Letting r be the discounting rate of future utility, the i−agent’s maximiza-
tion problem is:
max
si(t)
∫ +∞
0
{lnCi(t) + b lnPi(t)} e
−rtdt (7)
subject to the dynamic constraint (4). The agent i solves problem (7) taking as
exogenously given the value ofKs(t) and average values s(t), B(t) and Y (t); this
is due to the fact that the choice of si(t) by agent i does not modify the average
values, being economic agents a continuum. As a consequence, by applying the
Maximum Principle to problem (7) we obtain that the choices of individual i
do not depend on the co-state variable associated to Ks(t) (that is the “price”
of Ks(t)) in the maximization problem (7). Consequently, to solve problem (7),
agent i, in each instant t, chooses the value of si(t) maximizing the value of
the instantaneous utility function (5). This implies that the dynamics of Ks(t)
we study do not represent the social optimum. However, since agent i plays
the best response si(t), given the others’ choices, the trajectories followed by
Ks(t) represent Nash equilibria. In fact, along these trajectories, no agent has
incentive to modify his choices if the other agents do not revise their ones as
well.
To simplify our analysis, in this paper we focus on symmetric Nash equilib-
ria. In particular, we assume that individuals are identical and make the same
choices. This assumption allows us to study the choices of a representative agent.
Thus we can omit the subscript i in the variables si(t), Bi(t), Yi(t) and Ci(t)
writing simply s(t), B(t), Y (t) and C(t). In this symmetric Nash equilibrium
context, we have that ex ante average values s(t), B(t) and Y (t) are considered
as exogenously given by the representative agent; however, once s(t) is chosen,
ex post it holds:
s(t) = s(t)
B(t) = sε(t) · s1−ε(t) ·Kγs (t) = s(t) ·K
γ
s (t) = s(t) ·K
γ
s (t)
Y (t) = [1− s(t)] ·Kαs (t) = [1− s(t)] ·K
α
s (t)
In this context, the representative agent, in each instant of time t, chooses
s(t) solving the following static optimization problem:
max
s
{
ln [(1− s) ·Kαs ] + b ln
[
sεs1−εKγs + d · (1− s) ·K
α
s
]}
(8)
taking as exogenously given the values of s and Ks. The solution s(t) of the
problem (8) has to be substituted to s(t) in the equation (4) which, under our
symmetric Nash equilibria assumption, can be written as follows:
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K˙s(t) =
[
Y (t)
]β
·
[
B(t)
]δ
− ηKs(t) =
= [[1− s(t)] ·Kαs (t)]
β ·
[
sε(t) · s1−ε(t) ·Kγs (t)
]δ
− ηKs(t) =
= [1− s(t)]
β [s(t)]δ ·Kαβ+γδs (t)− ηKs(t) (9)
Where β and δ are strictly positive parameters. Note that under dynamics
(9), social capital accumulation is negative if s(t) = 0 (no social participation)
or if s(t) = 1 (the production/consumption of the private good is equal to zero).
As noted above, B(t) and Y (t) are both essential factors for the accumulation of
social capital. Thus, even if people devote all their time to social participation,
the stock of social capital is doomed to erosion if there is no private production
so that primary needs cannot be satisfied.
According to (9), the value of s(t) that, given Ks(t), maximizes the rate of
growth of Ks(t) is:
s(t) = sg :=
δ
β + δ
The latest expression can be interpreted as the “golden rule” for the accu-
mulation of social capital. Note that sg → 0 if δ → 0, and sg → 1 when the
value of β is negligible relative to that of δ.
4 Analysis of the model
4.1 The time allocation choice
For simplicity, we limit our analysis to “robust” cases only, that is those not
corresponding to equality conditions on parameters’ values. The following result
concerns the choice of s(t) by the representative agent (due to space constraints,
propositions’ proofs are omitted if straightforward).
Lemma 1 Problem (8) admits solution and the time allocation choice s∗(t) of
the representative agent is:
1. if γ − α > 0
s∗(t) =
 0, if Ks(t) ≤
(
d(b+1)
bε
) 1
γ−α
bεKγ−αs (t)−d(b+1)
(1+bε)Kγ−αs (t)−d(b+1)
, if Ks(t) >
(
d(b+1)
bε
) 1
γ−α
(10)
2. if γ − α < 0
s∗(t) =

bεKγ−αs (t)−d(b+1)
(1+bε)Kγ−αs (t)−d(b+1)
, if Ks(t) ≤
(
d(b+1)
bε+1
) 1
γ−α
0, if Ks(t) >
(
d(b+1)
bε+1
) 1
γ−α
(11)
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Social capital produces contrasting pressures on the representative agent’s
time allocation choices. Remember that γ and α are the exponents of Ks in the
production functions of B(t) and Y (t), respectively, b > 0 represents the weight
of social needs, and d measures the degree of substitutability between Bi(t) and
Ci(t) in the satisfaction of social needs Pi(t).
If γ−α > 0 then (ceteris paribus) an increase in the stock of social capitalKs
has the effect to raise the productivity of time spent on social participation s(t)
relative to that of time spent on the production and consumption of the private
good. In this case, if the stock of social capital is “high” enough, then social
participation will be positive (s(t) > 0). If social capital’s initial endowments
are “low”, then agents will devote all their time to private production: despite
the improvement in the productivity of time devoted to social participation,
the agents’ allocation choice will be guided by the necessity to meet the private
needs Ci(t) first.
If γ−α < 0 , an increase in the stock of social capital Ks raises the produc-
tivity of time spent on private production more than the productivity of time
devoted to social participation. Then, if the initial stock of social capital is
“high”, agents will prefer to “exploit” its eventual increases to raise the produc-
tion/consumption of private goods, and we will have s(t) = 0 . Otherwise, if the
stock of social capital is low, individuals will devote time to social interaction
leading to a positive level of participation.
An implication of such result is that, according to equation (4), the stock of
social capital cannot grow indefinitely when γ−α < 0. In this case, an increase
in the stock of social capital raises the productivity of time spent on private
production therefore leading to a restriction of social participation, which in
turn hampers the accumulation of social capital in the long run. By contrast,
when γ − α > 0, an increase in the stock of social capital can spark off a
self-feeding process resulting in an increase in the production/consumption of
relational goods and the formation and of new ties.
If there is no substitutability between private consumption C and the socially
provided goodB, that is d = 0 in (5), it holds d(b+1) = 0; therefore
(
d(b+1)
bε
) 1
γ−α
=
0 if γ − α > 0. In such context that, by (10)-(11), the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 2 Under the assumption d = 0, problem (8) gives the following
time allocation choice s∗(t) of the representative agent:
s∗d=0(t) =
bε
1 + bε
,whatever the value of Ks(t) is;
When the two goods are not Edgeworth substitutes in the satisfaction of
social needs, the reduction in the production/consumption of relational goods
is not accompanied by an increase in the marginal utility of private goods.
For example, the lack of amateur tennis players will not raise the marginal
utility of playing virtual matches against a playstation, and the reduction in the
number of friends available for going together to the cinema will not raise the
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marginal utility of devices to watch movies alone. In this case, private goods
will not replace socially provided goods for the satisfaction of social needs, and
participation will be constant and such that 1 > s∗(t) > 0, whatever the value
of Ks(t) is.
Notice that social participation s∗(t) in (10)-(11) is (ceteris paribus) a strictly
decreasing function of the parameter d, which measures the degree of substi-
tutability between B an C. Therefore, it always holds s∗(t) < s∗d=0(t). If agents
admit the possibility to satisfy social needs (or to compensate for their depriva-
tion) through the production/consumption of private goods (e.g. a playstation
is considered as a substitute of a match on the tennis field), then the level of
social participation will be lower, whatever the value of Ks(t) is.
5 Dynamics of social capital accumulation and
well-being analysis
Even if we have considered very simple specifications of functions F , G and H,
there may exist multiple steady states and poverty traps.
The following result concerns the evolution of representative agent’s well-
being along the trajectories under dynamics (9).
Proposition 3 Along the trajectories of (9), the values of the utility function
U and of Ks are positively correlated. This implies that if there exist two steady
states K1s and K
2
s such that K
2
s > K
1
s , then K
2
s Pareto-dominates K
1
s ; that is
K1s is a poverty trap.
The following proposition defines social capital dynamics resulting from the
time allocation choices of the representative agent described in Proposition (1).
Proposition 4 If γ − α > 0, social capital dynamics are given by:
·
Ks =
{
−ηKs[
Kγ−αs
(1+bε)Kγ−αs −d(b+1)
]β
·
[
bεKγ−αs −d(b+1)
(1+bε)Kγ−αs −d(b+1)
]δ
·Kαβ+γδs − ηKs
(12)
for, respectively, Ks ≤
(
d(b+1)
bε
) 1
γ−α
and Ks >
(
d(b+1)
bε
) 1
γ−α
.
If γ − α < 0, they are given by:
·
Ks =
{ [
Kγ−αs
(1+bε)Kγ−αs −d(b+1)
]β
·
[
bεKγ−αs −d(b+1)
(1+bε)Kγ−αs −d(b+1)
]δ
·Kαβ+γδs − ηKs
−ηKs
(13)
for, respectively, Ks ≤
(
d(b+1)
bε+1
) 1
γ−α
and Ks >
(
d(b+1)
bε+1
) 1
γ−α
.
Notice that, if d = 0 (that is relational and private goods are not substitutes),
the dynamics of social capital accumulation become:
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·Ks =
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ
·Kαβ+γδs − ηKs (14)
and the corresponding dynamic regimes are described by the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 5 Under the assumption of no Edgworth substitutability d = 0,
the basic features of dynamics are the following (whatever the sign of the ex-
pression γ − α is):
a) If αβ + γδ < 1, there exist two steady states:
Ks =
[
η(1 + bε)β+δ
(bε)δ
] 1
αβ+γδ−1
and Ks = 0
then the economy approaches Ks (the steady state Ks = 0 is repulsive) whatever
the initial value of Ks > 0 is.
b) If αβ + γδ = 1, then the steady state Ks = 0 is the unique steady state. In
particular,
b.1) if (bε)
δ
(1+bε)β+δ
< η, the economy reaches the steady state Ks = 0;
b.2) if (bε)
δ
(1+bε)β+δ > η, the economy follows a trajectory along which the value of
Ks grows indefinitely (that is Ks → +∞) at the constant rate
(bε)δ
(1+bε)β+δ
− η.
If private goods cannot substitute relational ones in the satisfaction of social
needs, then the economy can follow a virtuous trajectory where the stock of
social capital unboundedly grows, raising social participation and consolidating
interpersonal ties. When there is some degree of substitutability between C and
B, that is d > 0, dynamics become more complicated and are characterized by
the following propositions.
Proposition 6 Under the assumption of substitutability d > 0 and if γ−α > 0,
the dynamics are characterized by the following properties:
1. The steady state Ks = 0 is always locally attractive (whatever the value of
the expression αβ + γδ is).
2. If αβ+γδ < 1 then the number of steady states withKs > 0 is (generically)
zero (see Figure 1) or two (see Figure 2); if two steady states K1s and K
2
s
(K1s < K
2
s ) exist, then K
2
s is attractive while K
1
s is repulsive.
3. If αβ + γδ = 1 then there exists at least a steady state with Ks > 0;
furthermore, the number of steady states with Ks > 0 is one (see Figure
3) or three; if an unique steady state exists, then it is repulsive; if three
steady states K1s , K
2
s and K
3
s (K
1
s < K
2
s < K
3
s ) exist, then K
2
s is attractive
while K1s and K
3
s are repulsive. Finally, if
(bε)δ
(1+bε)β+δ
> η and the initial
value of Ks is greater than K∗s , where K
∗
s is the steady state with the
highest value of Ks, then there exists an unbounded endogenous growth
path with increasing well-being along which s→ bε1+bε .
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If agents tend to replace relational goods with private ones for the satisfaction
of social needs or to compensate for the deprivation of human interactions,
and if an increase in the stock of social capital Ks has the effect to raise the
productivity of time spent on social participation s(t) relative to that of time
spent on the production and consumption of the private good, then a steady
state where Ks = 0 is always locally attractive: the risk exists of an erosion of
the entire stock of social capital. Such risk can be warded off only if certain
conditions hold, as it will be pointed out later.
Under the assumption of substitutability (d > 0) and if γ − α < 0, the
dynamics are characterized by the following properties:
Proposition 7 1. The value of Ks always approaches a steady state value
lower than the upper bound
(
d(b+1)
bε+1
) 1
γ−α
(see proposition 4), whatever the
value of the expression αβ+γδ is. Consequently, the stock of social capital
Ks cannot grow indefinitely.
2. If αβ + γδ < 1, then the steady state Ks = 0 is always repulsive; there
exists at least a steady state with with Ks > 0; the number of steady states
with Ks > 0 is (generically) one (see Figure 4) or three; steady states with
an odd index are attractive and those with an even index are repulsive.
Whatever the initial value of Ks is, the economy approaches a steady state
with Ks > 0.
3. If αβ + γδ = 1, then the steady state Ks = 0 is always locally attractive;
the number of steady states with with Ks > 0 is zero (see Figure 5) or two
(see Figure 6); the steady states with an odd index are repulsive and those
with an even index are attractive1.
High initial endowments are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
an endogenous and unbounded growth of the stock of social capital. Necessary
and sufficient conditions are as follows:
γ − α > 0
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ
> η
αβ + γδ = 1
When these conditions hold, the poverty trapKs = 0 is always locally attrac-
tive; however, when the initial value of Ks is high enough, the economy follows
1Values of parameters in Figure 4: α = 0.9, β = 0.5, γ = 0.4, δ = 1, ε = 0.7, η = 0.04,
b = 4, d = 0.05; Figure 5: α = 0.9, β = 0.8, γ = 0.4, δ = 1, ε = 0.7, η = 0.24, b = 4, d = 0.05;
Figure 6: α = 0.9, β = 0.8, γ = 0.38, δ = 1, ε = 0.5,η = 0.12, b = 4, d = 0.4.
For α = 0.9, β = 0.5, δ = 0.55, γ = 1, ε = 0.5, η = 0.11, b = 4, d = 0.05 we obtain
three positive fixed points of coordinates K∗
s
= 1.27 (attractive), K∗∗
s
= 1.41 (repulsive),
K∗∗∗
s
= 1.52 (attractive).
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a trajectory along which Ks → +∞. As stated above, along such trajectory we
have that:
s→
bε
1 + bε
and the equation (12) “tends” (for Ks → +∞) to the equation:
·
Ks =
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ
·Ks − ηKs
which coincides with the equation (14) describing social dynamics under the
assumption d = 0 (no substitutability between C and B). This allows to say
that when the stock of social capital becomes high enough, then the dynamics
under the assumption d = 0 and those under the assumption d > 0 become
“very similar”. This result is more likely if b and ε ∈ (0, 1) exhibit high values
and if the social capital’s depreciation rate η is low. As pointed out above,
b measures the weight of social needs in determining people’s satisfaction. A
high value of b indicates that agents are not so prone to sacrifice their relational
sphere for private needs. Such parameter may be determined by cultural factors
acknowledging the importance of non market relations in respect to material
consumption. For example, a culture exalting the prominence of cooperation
and solidarity in social life is a good starting point. ε represents the productivity
of social participation in the individual production of relational goods. A high
value of this parameter indicates that agents are more capable to influence their
relational sphere with their own effort, independently of the current levels of
the others’ social participation and of the stock of social capital. This ability
may be due to “human” and “social” factors. As regards human factors, it
is remarkable that people have diverse attitudes towards social interactions.
Charismatic agents may be able to carry away other people in interpersonal
relationships even if the surrounding environment is not particularly rich of
social participation opportunities. Sociological studies claim that charismatic
agents behaving as leaders in social networks may work as catalysts for the
creation of social capital (Burt, 1999, Renshon, 2000, Roch, 2005). However,
aggregative behaviors need a certain degree of generalized trust to take place.
In a socially poor environment, agents may use their relational skills to produce
relational goods, and to carry away other people in social participation only if
there is a reasonable likelihood that their effort will not be wasted and will be
repaid. The diffusion of social norms of reciprocity is a crucial precondition for
such aggregative and pro-social behaviors. Individuals are more likely to resist
the temptation to satisfy social needs through the substitution of relational
goods with private ones if they perceive that their efforts will not be “betrayed”.
It is noteworthy that, starting from Coleman (1987, 1988), part of the literature
considers norms of trust and reciprocity as an integral part of the definition
of social capital. Following such approach, it is possible to argue that the
parameter ε incorporates human and social factors whose development in the
long run is influenced by the stock of social capital.
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The following 6 figures show solow-like graphes where the intersection points
between H
[
B(t), Y (t)
]
and ηKs(t) are fixed points of the differential equation.
The black dot is used for attractive stationary points, the grey dot for repulsive
stationary points 2 .
Figure 1 Figure 2
Figure 3 Figure 4
2Values of simulations in Figure 1: α = 0.01, β = 0.4, γ = 0.82, δ = 1, ε = 0.12, η = 0.15,
b = 4, d = 0.03; Figure 2: α = 0.01, β = 0.4, γ = 0.82, δ = 1, ε = 0.12, η = 0.04, b = 4,
d = 0.03; Figure 3: α = 0.4, β = 0.9, γ = 0.64, δ = 1, ε = 0.7, η = 0.3, b = 4, d = 0.3.
For α = 0.9, β = 0.5, δ = 0.55 , γ =1, ε = 0.5, η=0.11, b = 4, d = 0.05 we obtain three
positive fixed point of coordinates K∗
s
= 0.005 (repulsive), K∗∗
s
= 0.02 (attractive), K∗∗∗
s
= 93
(repulsive).
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Figure 5 Figure 6
6 The effects of (exogenous) technical progress
In previous sections, we argued that one of the main transmission mechanisms
leading from economic growth to social poverty may be the pressure on the time
allocation choices of the individuals. According to the folk wisdom, there is at
least another, crucial, link connecting growth to the growing social isolation of
our time: technology.
Technical progress may cause a decline in human interactions through two
main channels. Firstly, it creates ever more sophisticated material goods which
make private consumption seem more and more capable to replace relational
goods. As stated by Robert Putnam in the New York Times interview, people
can now get entertainment and information while remaining entirely alone. If
the surrounding social environment is not intriguing from a cultural and rela-
tional point of view, isolated people could be forced to satisfy their social needs
at home, by means of private consumption. Think for example of a teenager
living in an isolated mountain community: technology allows him to satisfy a
range of social needs simply connecting to the web for chatting, sharing photos,
playing chess at distance, and so on. When it is impossible to satisfy social needs
at distance, technical progress provides agents with a variety of opportunities to
compensate the deprivation of social interaction. For example, a virtual match
against the playstation can compensate for the lack of the time necessary to play
an actual match on a sport field. The latest home theatre is a (cold) comfort
for the lack of friends with whom watching movies at the cinema.
Secondly, technical progress and innovation adoption cause continuous changes
in production processes, raising the mobility of workers (Routledge and von
Amsberg, 2003). The rise in mobility may result in an increase in the “precari-
ousness” of labour, which in turn can be seen as a barrier to social integration
and as a factor of social capital’s destruction: a high level of flexibility on em-
ployment hampers the consolidation of ties, both inside and outside the work-
place. While a stable and satisfactory work provides not only income, but also
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an identity and a “sense of belonging”, precariousness generates discouragement
and distrust towards labour market institutions that, at the macro level, may
result in a more distrustful society. The high exposure to the risks of job loss
and intermittent unemployment raises the uncertainty on future incomes, mak-
ing people unhappy and less self-confident, more suspicious towards the others
and less able to plan crucial relational activities such as marriage and procre-
ation (Clarck and Oswald, 1994, Dockery, 2005, Di Tella et al., 1997). In other
words, technical progress can “crowd out” the workplace’s ability to nurture
social participation described in section 2.
In this section we study the dynamic effects generated by the introduction
of exogenous technical progress T (t) in the production function of the private
good:
Y (t) = T (t) · [1− s(t)] ·Kαs (t) (15)
where the growth rate of T is assumed to be given by the equation:
·
T (t) = σT (t) (16)
where σ is a strictly positive parameter representing the growth rate of T .
In such context, the time allocation choice s∗(t) by the representative agent is
described by the following proposition.
Lemma 8 If the production function of the private good is given by (15), then
problem (8) admits solution and the time allocation choice s∗(t) of the repre-
sentative agent is:If γ − α > 0
s∗(t) =
 0, if Ks(t) ≤
(
d·(b+1)·T (t)
bε
) 1
γ−α
bεKγ−αs (t)−d·(b+1)·T (t)
(1+bε)Kγ−αs (t)−d·(b+1)·T (t)
if Ks(t) >
(
d·(b+1)·T (t)
bε
) 1
γ−α
(17)
If γ − α < 0
s∗(t) =

bεKγ−αs (t)−d·(b+1)·T (t)
(1+bε)Kγ−αs (t)−d·(b+1)·T (t)
, if Ks(t) ≤
(
d·(b+1)·T (t)
bε+1
) 1
γ−α
0, if Ks(t) >
(
d·(b+1)·T (t)
bε+1
) 1
γ−α
(18)
6.1 The case without substitutability between C and B
If there is not substitutability between private consumption C and relational
goods B (i.e. if d = 0), social participation is constant and strictly positive
s∗(t) = bε/(1+bε); in such context, the dynamic of social capital’s accumulation
is given by the equation:
·
Ks =
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ
· TβKαβ+γδs − ηKs (19)
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where the evolution of T is described by the differential equation (16). Note
that
·
Ks = 0 for Ks = 0 and, if αβ + γδ < 1, along the graph of the function:
Ks =
[
(bε)δ
η(1 + bε)β+δ
] 1
1−αβ−γδ
· T
β
1−αβ−γδ (20)
which is increasing in T. Note that it holds
·
Ks < 0 above the curve (20) and
·
Ks > 0 below it.
The basic features of dynamics under the assumption of no substitutability
are described by the following Proposition.
Proposition 9 Dynamics (19) have the following properties:
1) If αβ+γδ < 1, then both T and Ks grow without bound (i.e. lim
t→+∞
T (t) =
+∞ and lim
t→+∞
Ks(t) = +∞) along any trajectory starting from a strictly positive
initial value ofKs. Among these trajectories, there exists a trajectory represented
by the equation:
Ks =
[
(1− αβ − γδ)(bε)δ
[βσ + η(1− αβ − γδ)] (1 + bε)β+δ
] 1
1−αβ−γδ
· T
β
1−αβ−γδ (21)
along which the growth rates of T and Ks are given by:
·
Ks
Ks
=
β
(1− αβ − γδ)
·
T
T
. (22)
where
·
T/T = σ by assumption and
·
Ks
Ks
>
·
T
T
if and only if β1−αβ−γδ > 1.
Along the remaining trajectories, the growth rate of Ks approaches the value
given in (22) as t→ +∞ (see Figure37).
2) If αβ + γδ = 1, then an explicit solution of (19) can be calculated :
Ks(t) =
Ks(0)e
A·[T (0)]βeβσt−ηtβσ
βσ
e
A·[T(0)]β
βσ
where A = (bε)
δ
(1+bε)β+δ
and Ks(0) and T (0) are the initial conditions on social
capital and technology (see Figure4 8).
Proof. The first part of Proposition can be proved by defining a new vari-
able:
x :=
Tβ
K
1−(αβ+γδ)
s
(23)
3Values of parameters: α = 0.3, β = 0.21, γ = 0.2, δ = 0.4, ε = 0.4, η = 0.02, σ = 0.4,
b = 0.1.
4Time-evolution of Ks. Values of parameters: α = 0.3, β = 0.9, γ = 0.73, δ = 1, ε = 0.4,
η = 0.18, σ = 0.9, b = 0.1. Initial condition: Ks(0) = 3, T (0) = 0.02.
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and by calculating its time derivative:
·
x =
Tβ
K
1−(αβ+γδ)
s
(β
·
T
T
− (1− (αβ + γδ))
·
Ks
Ks
) = (24)
= x
[
[βσ + η(1− αβ − γδ)]−
(bε)δ
(1 + bε)β+δ
(1− αβ − γδ)x
]
(25)
Equation (25) has two stationary states:
x∗ = 0 and x∗∗ =
[βσ + η(1− αβ − γδ)] (1 + bε)β+δ
(1− αβ − γδ)(bε)δ
Notice that, since αβ + γδ < 1, then x∗∗ > 0 is globally attractive in the
positive x-axis; since, by (24),
·
x = 0 if and only if (22), point 1) of Proposition
is proved. The second part follows by a direct calculation.
It is interesting to note that:
1. If there is no substitutability between C and B, then Ks can grow without
bond, whatever the sign of the expression γ−α is (we will show that this
result no more holds when there is substitutability).
2. Along the trajectories under dynamics (19), the evolution ofKs is monotonic
(always increasing or decreasing) or follows a U-shaped path, according to
which Ks is initially decreasing and then becomes definitively increasing.
It is worth to stress such result in that, as we will see, if there is substi-
tutability between C and B, then the evolution of Ks can take the shape
of an inverted U curve.
Figure 7 Figure 8
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6.2 The case with substitutability between C and B
If d > 0, then social participation s∗ depends on the values of T and Ks and
can assume the value 0. In particular, the graph of the function:
Ks =
(
d(b+ 1)T
bε
) 1
γ−α
(26)
separates, in the plane (T,Ks), the region where s∗ = 0 (below the curve)
from that where s∗ > 0 (above it). Note that the function (26) is increasing
(decreasing) in T if γ − α > 0 (respectively, if γ − α < 0).
In the region where s∗ = 0, social capital dynamics are given by
·
Ks =
−ηKs < 0 and the slope of trajectories
dKs
dT
= −ηKs
σT
is negative; this implies
that along the trajectories below the curve (26), T increases and Ks decreases.
Above the curve (26), social capital dynamics are given by:
·
Ks =
[
Kγ−αs
(1 + bε)Kγ−αs − d(b+ 1)T
]β
·
[
bεKγ−αs − d(b+ 1)T
(1 + bε)Kγ−αs − d(b+ 1)T
]δ
·TβKαβ+γδs −ηKs
(27)
where T evolves according to the differential equation (16).
The basic features of dynamics (27) are described in the following Proposi-
tion.
Proposition 10 If γ−α > 0, then the region under the curve (26) is positively
invariant under dynamics: every trajectory entering such region cannot leave it.
Along the trajectories under the curve (26), the value of Ks approaches 0 for
t→ +∞ (see Figure 9).
If γ − α < 0, then the region above (under) the curve (26) is positively
invariant if σ/η(α−γ) ≥ 1 (respectively, if σ/η(α−γ) < 1); in any case, along
every trajectory the value of Ks approaches 0 for t→ +∞ (see Figure5 10 and
11 ).
Proof. To check the results on positive invariance of the sets under or
above the curve (26), we have simply to compare the slope of the trajectories
dKs
dT
= −ηKs
σT
, evaluated along the curve (26), and the slope of (26). To prove
the results about the evolution of Ks, notice that in the set where s
∗ = 0 it
holds dKs
dt
= −ηKs and consequently Ks(t) = Ks(0) · e
−ηt, where Ks(0) is the
initial value of Ks. Finally, note that, in case γ − α < 0, every trajectory lies
definitively in the set under the curve (26) or in the set above it; in any case,
since T → +∞, the value of Ks approaches 0.
Whatever the sign of the expression γ−α is, along the trajectories crossing
the curve (26) we will show that the evolution of Ks can take an inverted U-
shape, differently from the case without substitutability.
5Values of parameters in Figure 9: α = 0.7, β = 0.2, γ = 0.2, δ = 0.3, ε = 0.4, η=0.06,
σ = 0.04, b = 3, d = 0.3, Figure 10: α=0.3, β = 0.2, γ = 0.71, δ = 0.3, ε = 0.4, η = 0.06,
σ = 0.04, b = 3, d = 0.3.
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According to the above Proposition, a necessary condition to have unbounded
growth of Ks is γ − α > 0; that is, the importance (measured by α) of Ks as
an input in the production process of the private good must be lower than its
importance (measured by γ) in the production process of the relational good.
To analyze the behaviour of Ks in case γ−α > 0 we introduce the following
definition.
Definition 11 A Regular Growth Curve (RGC) is a curve in the plane (T,Ks)
along which the rate of growth of T is equal to the exogenously given value σ
while the rate of growth of Ks is equal to a constant strictly positive value g,
possibly different from σ.
Notice that along a RGC, being
·
T
T
= σ and
·
Ks
Ks
= g, it holds dKs
dT
=
·
Ks
·
T
=
gKs
σT
; consequently a RGC is the graph of a function Ks (T ) = CT
g
σ , where C is
a positive arbitrary constant. RGCs are not trajectories under our dynamics.
However, we aim to show that, for T high enough, there exist values of g and C,
that we will denote by g and C respectively, such that the corresponding RGC
Ks (T ) = CT
g
σ is asymptotically approached, for T → +∞, by the trajectories
starting “near” to it. This implies that along such trajectories
·
Ks
Ks
→ g as
t→ +∞.
Notice that, for T high enough, a RGC can be approached by the trajectories
only if it lies above the curve (26); this requires that g must satisfy the necessary
condition: g
σ
> 1
γ−α
, where 1
γ−α
> 1. That is, it must hold g > σ
γ−α
(where
σ
γ−α
> σ). So we introduce a further definition.
Definition 12 A Reachable Regular Growth Curve (RRGC) is a RGC satis-
fying the condition g > σ
γ−α
(see Figure6 11).
Looking at (17), it is easy to check that, along a RRGC, the social par-
ticipation choice s∗ approaches the value bε(1+bε) as t → +∞. Remember that
bε
(1+bε) is the value of social participation in the context without substitutability.
In other words, if T and Ks grow following a RRGC, then for T and Ks high
enough, social participation is “almost” equal to the level achieved under the
assumption of no substitutability. Now the problem is: are there values of g and
C such that the associated RRGC may be approached by some trajectories of
our dynamics? To solve this problem, we analyze the behavior of the variable:
x =
Tβ
K1−αβ−γδs
previously defined (see (23)) and limit our analysis to the case 1−αβ−γδ > 0.
Remember that in the context in which s∗ = bε(1+bε) always (i.e. in the context
without substitutability), it holds
·
x = 0 (see (24)) along the curve (see (21)):
6Value of parameters: α = 0.82, β = 0.71, γ = 0.7, δ = 0.92, ε = 0.6, η = 0.02, b = 3,
d = 0.3.
23
Ks = C · T
g
σ
where C ≡
[
(1−αβ−γδ)(bε)δ
[βσ+η(1−αβ−γδ)](1+bε)β+δ
] 1
1−αβ−γδ)
and g ≡ β1−αβ−γδ . So, if
βσ
1−αβ−γδ >
σ
γ−α
(i.e. β1−αβγδ (γ−α) > 1), we have that, as T → +∞, alongKs =
C · T
g
σ the value of
·
x approaches 0 while
·
x becomes (see (24)) strictly positive
(respectively, strictly negative) along the RRGCs corresponding to values of
g < g (respectively g > g), with g and C near enough to g and C, respectively.
This implies that all trajectories starting (for T high enough) sufficiently near
to Ks = C · T
g
σ , approach Ks = C · T
g
σ as T → +∞.
Notice that, by Proposition 3, all trajectories in the plane (T,Ks) can be
Pareto-ranked; in particular, we have that, given two trajectories K˜s(T ) and
K̂s(T ), with K˜s(T ) < K̂s(T ), then K̂s(T ) Pareto-dominates K˜s(T ). Further-
more, well-being may be decreasing when the economy follows a trajectory along
which Ks → 0 (see Figures7 12, 13, 14).
Figure 9 Figure 10
Figure 11 Figure 12
7Values of parameters in Figures 12, 13, 14: α = 0.7, β = 0.2,γ = 0.2, δ = 0.3, ε = 0.4,
η = 0.01, σ = 0.04, b = 3, d = 0.3.
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Figure 13 Figure 14
7 Concluding remarks
Our framework addresses a range of hypotheses that have never been jointly
taken into account within a theoretical model. Agents allocate their time be-
tween labour, aimed at the production of private goods, and social participation
activities. Private consumption and relational goods are substitutable: if the
environment is poor of participation opportunities and social participation are
perceived as costly and frustrating, people can disengage from relational activi-
ties and devote more time and resources to private consumption. Following hints
from political science, we account for the possibility of positive spillovers from
private to relational production, due the ability of job interactions to stimulate
the creation of durable ties. Following hints from the sociological literature,
we assume that most of the times the creation of interpersonal ties does not
depend on rational investment decisions. Rather, it is an incidental, not neces-
sary, by-product of social participation. The resulting stock is a public resource,
which enters as an argument in agent’s utility function and as an input in both
“material” and “relational” goods’ production functions. Since human relations
need a continuous care to be preserved over time, we account for a positive
depreciation rate of the stock of social capital. The main results of our study
can be summarized as follows.
In the framework without technical progress, an unbounded growth of social
capital can be only observed in the following to cases:
a) The case in which private goods and relational ones are not Edgeworth
substitutes.
b) The case in which the two types of goods are Edgeworth substitutes but
relevance of the stock of social capital impact on the production/consumption
process of relational goods is greater than in the production process of private
ones (i.e. γ − α > 0).
In both cases (a) and (b), social capital dynamics is path-dependent; in a
“favourable” configuration of the model’s parameters, starting from an high
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enough initial endowment of social capital, the economy follows a virtuous tra-
jectory where the stock of social capital endogenously and unboundedly grows,
raising social participation and consolidating interpersonal ties. On the other
side, the reverse process may be self-feeding as well: if the initial endowment of
social capital is low, then the economy experiences a simultaneous decline in so-
cial participation and social capital leading to “social poverty traps” where time
spent on relational activities becomes more expensive (in terms of opportunity
cost) and less productive (in terms of relational goods).
If private and relational goods are substitutes but (b) doesn’t hold (i.e.
γ − α < 0), then no trajectory exists along which social capital grows without
bound.
In the context without technical progress, the evolution of social capital
is always monotonic, always increasing or decreasing; introducing exogenous
technical progress in the production function of private goods leads to interesting
modifications in social capital’s accumulation dynamics. In such context, social
capital’s trend relative to technical progress can be non monotonic; in particular,
it may experience an initial decline followed by a growth, but not vice versa (a
growth followed by a decline is impossible), if relational and private goods are
not substitutes, while under the assumption of substitutability the stock of social
capital may exhibit a growth followed by a decline, so that its relationship with
technical progress is described by an inverted U-shaped curve. Since technical
progress is in turn positively correlated with GNP, our result supports Putnam’s
(2000) intuition of the inverted U-shaped relationship between social capital and
development.
Also under the assumption of exogenous technical progress, there exist tra-
jectories along which social capital can grow without bound only in the contexts
(a) and (b) described above. The possibility to find the path to sustainable
growth of social capital crucially depends on the initial endowment of social
capital: an environment rich of participation opportunities, a culture acknowl-
edging the importance of non market relations, the diffusion of moral norms
of reciprocity and cooperation certainly constitute a good, desirable “starting
point”.
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